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SUBJECT [REDACTED]			DATE 10-10-10
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>63. SCHILLERBERG says that the change in Roumania in 1944 came as a surprise though the symptoms recorded by his Intelligence Service were so numerous and serious that an intelligent "pushing" ought to have reacted. A report by the Chief of the Roumanian Secret Service, CHRISTESCU, was particularly alarming. He had repeatedly invited SCHILLERBERG to visit him and tried to add weight to this invitation by showing kindness in rendering services. HINTERBERG and the reports of von KILLINGER who, as SCHILLERBERG put it, "was certainly not quite normal," frustrated all warnings. HINTERBERG never showed any intention to expose himself regarding Roumania. SCHILLERBERG was even offered a "mission to work" in Roumania (the same veto existed for Italy and France) for the change in Roumania. SCHILLERBERG had reorganized the coal and oil region. For that purpose he had a special permission of HINTERBERG.</p>			
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warnings. HINER never showed an inclination to expose himself to the
Roumanians. SCHELLBERG was even officially forbidden to "work" in the
(the same was to exist for Italy). Before an exchange of Roumanian
SCHELLBERG had reorganised the German espionage service in the Floesti
oil region. For that purpose he had to get the special permission of
HITLER.

64. Immediately after the beginning of disorders in Roumania,
SCHELLBERG and "Volksgruppenführer" Andreas SCHMIDT who was "by chance"
in Berlin, were summoned before HIMMLER. Horia SIMA had immediately been
released. SCHELLBERG met him, together with SCHMIDT, at a dinner party
given by HIMMLER. SIMA made a timid, weakly and sickly impression. He
did not strike SCHELLBERG as a particularly impressive personality. The
shape of his head was characterised by a relatively high but strongly
receding brow. SCHELLBERG says that his experience of heads shaped thus
was not good and added that they pertain to fanatics and that HITLER too
had a receding brow.

65. It was decided that SIMA should immediately form a counter
Government and start a resistance movement together with SCHMIDT. For this
purpose use should be made of the remaining adherents of the "Iron Guard"
as well as the "Volks" Germans in the "Volks"-group of SCHMIDT. Both SIMA
and SCHMIDT were instantly sent to Budapest by plane. Amt VI and Mil-Amt
were to supply technical support for W/T, money and training. SCHELLBERG
eg. that in order to understand how this worked in practice the following
must be considered:-

- (1) SCHMIDT and KUNZECK were sworn enemies.
- (2) KUNZECK claimed political leadership vis a vis SCHMIDT, and last but not least,
- (3) Horia SIMA hoped to make special arrangements with the
German Foreign Office (Minister ALTENBURG and Professor
SIX), with military quarters in Vienna, and above all
with the Mil-Amt (Front Reconnaissance).

When SCHELLBERG wanted to make order the "Vienna clique" headed by KUNZECK
HINER assailed him. SCHELLBERG therefore left the whole thing to stew
in its own juice. He says that quite naturally nothing much resulted from
it. When it came to the worst (in the military domain SCHELLBERG had
settled the question previously in detail with OHLEITZ of Mil C. and WIESE
of Vienna), SCHELLBERG summoned SIMA who appeared accompanied by a Legation
counsellor of the German Foreign Office (for SIMA had in the meantime been
made "Excellenz") and informed him in an unmistakable way that he had to
apply to KUNZECK in all questions relating to the "Geheime Meldedienst" and
so on. According to SCHELLBERG, this step at least had the result that
all intelligence measures undertaken by air were in future controlled by one
single quarter.

66. SCHMIDT then flew to Roumania. His plane crashed. He continued
his journey on foot, established contact with all his men and reported one
day that he would return by Roumanian plane. According to W/T messages
sent by the "Hauptbeauftragter" SCHMIDT, SCHMIDT's plane was shot down. It
was alleged that the ground staff had betrayed his flight. SCHMIDT was said
to be only wounded. It was reported at OHLEITZ's last phase, that
he had entered into close contact with the German intelligence services.
So far as SCHELLBERG was concerned, the German intelligence services were
He does not know what happened to SCHMIDT.

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